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Notes and Comments
State Responsibility To Espouse Claims
Of Nationals Based On Contracts
With Foreign Nations
The international community today is experiencing unprecedented growth in international trade and commerce. The increasing
number of international contracts which have resulted has heightened
concern for providing adequate protection against contract breach.
This comment will focus on contract undertakings between an
individual or a corporation and a foreign state. In particular, consideration will be given to the situation in which a state enters a contract with
a foreign party that subjects it to a claim by the state of the alien
individual or corporation under the theory of state responsibility in-.
international law. An attempt will be made to determine why, how,
and when a state may act to aid its citizen in the event that a contract
breach occurs.
I.
Before considering the circumstances which would allow a state to
intervene in the case of a contract breach by a foreign state, it should be
noted that certain means of protection are available to the private
contractor which can preclude the need of state-sponsored assistance.
In fact, careful draftsmanship of an international contract should
eliminate the need of sovereign aid by including provisions for the
settlement of questions pertaining to contract performance.
The two most common provisions in a well-drafted contract are
the choice-of-law clause and the arbitration clause.' Through these
provisions, the contracting state can be prevented from manipulating
its sovereign processes to its own advantage. For example, if the alien
corporation can secure a clause making its national law applicable to
both the construction of the contract and the requirements for perfor'A study of international contracts on file at the World Bank reveals that in nearly
all cases these agreements contained an arbitration clause. While choice-of-law
provisions were also found in numerous instances, they were not included as often as
agreements to arbitrate. Broches, Choice-of-Law Provisions in Contracts with Governments, in INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS: CHOICE OF LAW AND LANGUAGE 64 (W. Reese ed.
1962).
One should also note the importance of the arbitration clause in contracts made
with the Soviet Union. The Soviets strongly prefer arbitration over litigation. The
Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations, the government agencies which are responsible
for the purchase and sale of specific goods for the production enterprises, will include
in every draft contract a provision for arbitration, most likely before the Foreign Trade
Arbitration Commission of the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce. If this offer is
rejected, the Soviets will continue to press for an arbitration provision, hoping to have
some neutral country named as the site. See Ayre, Negotiating Commercial Contracts
with the Soviets, 61 A.B.A.J. 835 (1975).
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mance, the national state that is party to the agreement can avoid its
commitments only by arbitrarily nullifying the contract. 2 Arbitration
clauses are heavily relied on in international contracts and work in
close conjunction with choice-of-law provisions. An agreement to

arbitrate, even if the arbitrator may apply the law of the state that is a
party to the contract, prevents the use of sovereign power by that state
to circumvent contract obligations.
Use of either of the above provisions should prevent an injured
corporation or individual from needing to rely on intervention by its
own state when a contract breach occurs and from incurring the delay

and expense of acting through international legal channels.
II.

Generally, international law governs the conduct of sovereign
states. 3 Consequently, private parties have no standing to espouse a
claim in the international system. 4 Usually, the only direct recourse for

an injured corporation or individual 'against a foreign sovereign is
through the municipal law of that state. If no satisfaction can be
obtained in the local courts, then only. the state of the injured party

may demand redress by the foreign nation for the alleged violation of
its duty in international law. 5

In demanding redress, the claimant state acts neither as agent nor
trustee for its national. 6 The state maintains its own legal right - its
right to have its citizens treated in accord with the principles of
international law. It is the denial of justice to the foreign sovereign's
7
citizen which constitutes the distinct international basis for the claim.

Given the individual character of the international claim, it follows
that the injured individual has no legally enforceable right against his

own government to compel it to press his claim internationally. 8 The
2

Mann, State Contracts and State Responsibility, 54 A.J.I.L. 573 (1960).
See, e.g., 1 G.HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-12 (1940).

3

4Contrary to orthodox theory, much evidence can be found suggesting that
individuals or corporations may have international legal rights and responsibilities.
See, e.g., 1 C. HYDE. INTERNATIONAL LAw 33-40 (2d ed. 1945). Several recent international developments promote the extension of international status to entities that are
not sovereign states. See generally, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Convention for the Protection of

Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in
COLLECTED TEXTS (6th ed. 1969).

EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS:

5Of course, the private party must be a national of the state seeking satisfaction in
the international arena. For a discussion of the concept of nationality, see 8 M.
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-187 (2d ed. 1967).
6
See id. at 1216.
7
See the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case, [1924] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 2.
8
The Constitution of the United States contains no express provision concerning
the duty of the sovereign to represent internationally the claims of its individual
citizens. Such is not the case in several other nations. See, e.g. GRUNDGESTEL art. 29 (W.
Ger., 1949). However, while there is no legal compulsion for the United States to act,
there may be an obligation or a duty to act based on certain constitutional concepts
such as the Executive's power over foreign affairs. For a discussion of this theory, see
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government has complete control over such claims. Several factors political, economic, legal and equitable - are considered by the state in
determining whether to seek an international solution. 9 Once obtained, any such international solution is final.
If the government decides to espouse the claim, it communicates
the claim to the foreign state charged with the contract breach.
Thereafter, several avenues of negotiation are available to settle the
dispute. Informal discussion and use of good offices are the least
drastic means of settlement. 10 Formal diplomatic protests might also be
used. If these means, prove ineffective, there is recourse to existing
international arbitral commissions."1 Lump sum settlement agreements are also available in many cases. 12 Recourse to other international tribunals such as the International Court of Justice is also a
possibility, but it must be recognized that persuading a foreign state to
submit voluntarily to the jurisdiction of such a tribunal may be a
problem. 13
A corollary to the right of a government to refuse to submit a claim
for international settlement is the power to have complete control of
the means to espouse the claim. 14 Given this right, the government can
alter, compromise, or abandon the claim without the consent of the
holder. In addition, the claim is usually consolidated with other
individual claims which the government has against the other party. 15
As a result, while any recovery paid to the government is customarily
Note, The Nature and Extent of Executive Power to Espouse the International Claims of
United States Nationals, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 95 (1973).
9The method of balancing these factors has never been clearly determined. Nor
has it been determined whether any attempt is made to balance these competing
interests. Whiteman suggests that a decision whether to espouse an individual's claim
is simply "political in nature [and] within the province of the Executive..." 8 M.
WHITEMAN, supra note 5, at 1216. Mr. Borchard writes that "it is a matter of expediency
whether in the particular case [the state's] right of interposition shall be exercised."
Borchard, Contractual Claims in InternationalLaw, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 458 (1913).
Professor Dunn considers the real basis for determining whether to press a claim to be
a matter of allocation of risks involved in dealing in international business affairs. F.
DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS 191 (1932).
1"See note 24 infra.
"While there may be some hesitancy on the part of the United States to use
official diplomatic channels in the case of a contract claim, the State Department
generally is willing to submit contract claims to existing arbitral commissions with
jurisdiction
to hear such matters. See Borchard, supra note 9, at 471.
12For an explanation on the workings of lump sum agreements, see FOREIGN
CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMMISSION, DECISIONS AND ANNOTATIONS 1-10 (1968).
3
See, e.g., I.C.J. Stat. art. 36 para. 2.
4
See E. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 366-380 (1927).
1sIt should be noted that the claim retains its individual character until it is
espoused by the government; and, until that time it is subject to the control of the
individual who has suffered the injury. As a result, any reparation that is obtained
prior to official government action, even if this recovery stems from unofficial
government aid, goes directly to the private citizen. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§211 (1965).
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passed on to the private party, the
right to this payment is not a matter
16
of domestic law but of equity.
Although the power of a state to pursue international claims is
extensive, it is also highly discretionary. But the duty, of the state to
respond to a violation of international law that injures its citizens is
clear. The most difficult question which a state or its injured citizen
must answer is: When did the international violations occur?
III.

The theory of state action and contract breach enunciated by the
United States distinguishes contract breach claims of an individual
against a foreign state from other international wrongs. While an
international tort may bring an immediate response by the state of the
injured individual, the Department of State of the United States has
stated that:
[Cilaims arising out of contractual relationships between a national of this
government and a foreign government do not, generally speaking, pro.vide a proper subject for diplomatic intervention on the part of this
Government in the absence of a clear showing that the American national
has exhausted such local remedies as may be open to him and has
sustained a denial of justice as that term is understood in international
law. 17

This rule presupposes that the breach of contract has no tortious
elements. Generally, contract claims may not be classified as tort
8
claims. They are distinguishable. 1
There are several bases for this distinction. First, a citizen enters a
contract voluntarily. Second, the private investor subjects himself to
local law by going abroad to do business. And third, practically every
civilized state may be sued for breach of contract but the same may not
be true for tort claims. 19 But if the state conduct is tortious in the
contract breach or constitutes a denial of justice, 20 action by the
government of the aggrieved private party may be immediately forth2
coming. 1
However, the absence of some international wrongdoing does not
mean that the aggrieved individual's sovereign must remain entirely
16The Nature and Extent of Executive Power to Espouse the International Claims of
United States Nationals, supra note 8, at 105.
17Letter from Attorney Adviser Matre to Hershel Davis, May 14, 1956, MS.
Department of State, file 284A.1141 Davis, Hershel/4-3056, quoted in 8 M. WHITEMAN,
supra note 5, at 907.
"8 Distinctions must also be made among contract claims themselves. This paper
deals with contracts for the supply of goods and for the exercise of concessions.
Contracts involving bonded indebtedness cover a different topic of inquiry. For a
discussion of claims dealing with bonds see, e.g., Borchard, supra note 9; see also
Mann, The Law Covering State Contracts, 21 BRIT. Y.B.INT'L L. 11 (1944).

"9 Borchard, supra note 9, at 460-61.
20 See text accompanying note 49, infra.
21
See 2 C. HYDE, supra note 4, at 988.
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inactive. Prior to a showing of an international breach, the state may
use its informal good offices in an effort to bring about a solution to a
contract dispute. 22 Though the action is unofficial, the results may be
as concrete as if gained through an international settlement.
The theory of contract breach illuminates what may constitute
internationally wrongful conduct. There is dispute as to whether a
breach of a contract by a state with respect to a foreign national is a
per se violation of international- law or whether something in addition
to a mere contract breach is necessary. 23 Determination that a contract
breach would result .in an international violation has important consequences. 2 4 If a contract breach by a foreign state violates international law, the government of the injured individual could espouse the
claim without showing any more internationally wrongful conduct.
But, if the per se concept is rejected, then an international tribunal
hearing a dispute would be acting as an appeals court for the local
25
judiciary in deciding contractual issues.
Generally, those who claim that an immediate violation of international law results from a contract breach by a state believe that there
should be no distinction drawn between an alleged tortious delict and
a wrong stemming from a state's attempt to avoid its contract obligations. 26 Others would apply the concept of pacta sunt servanda; that is,
that contracts are to be honored absolutely. 27 A third view asserts that
the normal expectations of the parties to a contract are that the contract
will be performed in the manner originally agreed upon. These
expectations are said to be fundamental and are cited as the basis for
international investment. Thus, in order to assure continued international investment, this view proposes immediate international sanc28
tions in the event of a state instigated contract breach.
22

Borchard, supra note 14, at 288, defines good offices as ".... personal recommendations [which] are not tendered officially, although the government may
authorize or direct a diplomatic representative to extend them."
23
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, §193, comment c.
24
Professor Amerasinghe details four important procedural consequences resulting from a determination that a breach of contract by a state with an alien is per se a
violation of international law. First, the final arbiter of the contract dispute would be
an international court, whether as a court of last resort or otherwise. Second, the
norms of international law, not those of municipal law, would be applicable for any
court hearing the dispute. Third, questions of evidence and procedure would be
governed by international law. Fourth, any remedy and its mode of fulfillment would
be governed by international standards. Amerasinghe, State Breaches of Contracts with
Aliens and International Law, 58 A.J.I.L. 775, 786 (1959).
25
See Jennings, State Contracts in InternationalLaw, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 156, 167-69
(1961).
26
Amerasinghe, supra note 24, at 882-83.
27
Wehberg, Pacta Sunt Servanda, 53 A.J.I.L. 775, 786 (1959). An interesting
modification of this theory is suggested by Professor Jennings, supra note 25.
28
See, e.g. Schwebel, International Protection of Contractual Arrangements, in PROCEEDINGS 256, 269-70 (Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 1969). Schwebel also enumerates several
additional factors he considers supportive of a per se theory. Id. at 267-71. First, he
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A view contrary to the per se theory requires something in addition
to a mere contract breach in order to hold a state responsible under
international law. The basis for this view rests on the assumption by
the individual of his contract responsibilities. A private party entering
a contract is seen as consenting freely not only to the entry into the
contract but also to the application of municipal law to that contract.
Unless contract provisions have specified otherwise, any remedy must
come from local courts. 29 International law can protect the individual
only from abuses stemming from manipulation of the local judicial
30
system.
Language from international decisions can be found which supports either view; 31 though in most cases; the issue of the theory of
contract breach is not specifically addressed. 32 Nor does state practice
follow a uniform theory. Nations, in furthering their own interests,
naturally espouse the view most beneficial to their cause. 33 Hence,
"the expropriating state [takes] one position, and the state of the
'34
investor, another.
The United States has consistently required more than a mere
breach before it will act on an individual's contract claim. 35 Given the
firmness with which the State Department has expressed the American
position, it seems unlikely that this view would change. Even though a
unified theory of remedy for contract breach has not developed in
international law, an American corporation will likely need to show
more than contract breach by a foreign party to get its claim assumed
by the United States government. This burden exists partly because of
the point of view of the State Department and partly because of the
lack of uniformity given the meaning of various terms used to indicate
when a breach of international law occurs. But if precise definitions are
given the terms most often relied upon in discussing international
delicts, the acts constituting such wrongs can readily be isolated.
notes that most states have some roles in the negotiation and drafting of international
contracts which gives these agreements an immediate quasi-international character.
Second, he states the proposition that nations are not the sole subjects of international
contract clauses calling for the use of international law in the event disputes arise. See
text accompanying note 3 supra.
29
See text accompanying note 1, supra.
30
See Amerasinghe, supra note 24, at 897-98.
31E.g., International Fisheries Co. Case (United States v. Mexico), AmericanMexican Claims Commission Opinions 207, 218 (1930-31); The Arabian American Oil
Co. Case, Arbitral Award at 61, 125, quoted in 8 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 5,at 912-13.
32
Professor Amerasinghe discusses in detail numerous international discussions
dealing
3 3 with contract breach. Amerasinghe, supra note 24, at 891-97.
See e.g., Losinger & Co. Case, [1936] P.C.I.J., ser. C, No. 78; Norwegian Loans
Case, [1957] I.C.J. 9.
34
Schwebel, supra note 28 at 269.
35
See text accompanying note 17, supra.
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The concept most prone to abuse is the much cited "denial of
36
justice". This term has been given a vast number of interpretations.
Definitions range from a broad concept of "any violation of the rights
of an alien resulting from acts or omissions on the parts of the
executive, legislative, or judicial branches of government," to a narrower scope of a "judicial" definition of the phrase. Under this latter
definition, a denial of justice is limited to wrongs committed by the
37
judicial branch of government.
This judicial interpretation is more effective than a broad definition because it enumerates the acts which would constitute an international breach. It makes the nature of the international wrong more
comprehensible by focusing on the local nature of the violation. The
result of the act is an international violation, but the origin of the act is
38
the improper conduct of the local judiciary.
Acceptance of the judicial concept of a denial of justice is widespread. 39 Since the State Department requires exhaustion of local
remedies before a denial of justice 40 claim may be asserted, it is clear
the United States impacts a judicial meaning to the term. Former legal
advisor to the State Department Hackworth has written, "[Denial of
Justice] is more frequently employed with acts or omissions of the
judicial branch, as distinguished from other branches of the government, since generally speaking, exhaustion of available judicial remedies is a prerequisite to a valid complaint that the alien has been
41
denied justice."
Thus, the assumption can be made that the term is limited to
judicial activity. But what specific acts would incur international
liability? The requirement that there should be an exhaustion of local
remedies prior to a claim of a denial of justice would seem to limit the
concept to some active injustice imposed by the local courts of the
contracting state. Therefore, judicial action would be required before
36

Six general meanings have been given the phrase by writers: 1) the equivalent of
every international wrong committed to the prejudice of foreigners by a state; 2) a
limitation to certain unlawful acts or omissions on the part of judicial authorities; 3) a
procedural definition limited to a denial of access to the courts; 4) a third judicial
interpretation which includes not only a denial of access to the courts but also
wrongful judgments; 5) a failure of an alien to obtain redress for an earlier wrongful
act committed either by a private person or by a state agent; 6) an additional judicial
definition encompassing any failure on the part of governmental organs charged with
administering justice to aliens to conform to their international duties. A. FREEMAN,
THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR DENIAL OF JUSTICE 96-97 (1970).
37
d. at 97.
38
Id. at 105-15.
39

Writers generally accept this view. See, e.g., C. EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
115 (1928). International tribunals are also mostly in

STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

accord with this definition. E.g. Mexico (Garcia and Garza) v. United States, Opinion
of Commissioners 163 (1927), quoted in 21 A.J.I.L. 585 (1927).
40
See text accompanying note 17, supra.
411 C. HACKWORTH, supra note 3, at 526.
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an international claim could be made. However, this restrictive view
has not been accepted. Instead, the term has been viewed as encompart of all governmental organs
passing any acts or omissions on the
42
charged with administering justice.
The individual or corporation trying to meet the burden of
showing more than mere contract breach through proving denial of
justice must show a willingness to submit the contract dispute to the
local judiciary for settlement. After acceptance of local judicial authority, any subsequent injustice, whether it be an affirmative act or an
existing bar to justice, would be a sufficient basis for international
action by the state of the injured party. Under this view, an exhaustion
of local remedies would not be necessary where justice in the local
courts is wholly lacking, where the local courts are menaced or
judicial
controlled by a hostile mob, or where past experience and prior
43
decisions have shown that local remedies are insufficient.
If the dispute reaches the local courts, several types of affirmative
judicial action could also result in a denial of justice. An unjust
judgment would be cause for international complaint. A judicial decree
should be denied international recognition if it fails to conform to
international concepts of fairness and good faith. 44 In addition, there is
general agreement among scholars that unreasonable delay in the
prosecution of an action by judicial authorities constitutes internationally improper conduct. 45 Prejudice on the part of the local courts
because of the alien status of the private party would also be a denial of
justice. 4 6 Any arbitrary abuse of judicial power by the local courts
based on the character of the parties involved falls short of international standards and provides a basis for an international claim.
However, the fact that the opinion of the court could or should have
been different is not a sufficient basis for a claim of a denial of justice.
"Nations are considered to be equal, and with but few exceptions,
judgments of their courts of last resort are considered to be and are
47
accepted as just and proper."

While a denial of justice most often reflects only judicial impropriety, this definition ignores a major source of concern in contract
dealings today which is the use of sovereign power by the legislative
and executive branches of government to annul or modify a contract
with an alien investor. The distinguishing feature in this type of breach
is the interjection of arbitrary governmental power to alter or terminate
42

See note 38 supra; see also RESTATEMENT. supra note 15 §§ 178-82.
5 G. HAckWOR T., sbpra note 3, at 511.
44
See, e.g., HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL
43See

LAW, DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF kISPONSIBILiTY OF STATES FOR DAMAGES DONti IN THEIR TEiiRITORY
TO THE PERSON OR PROPERTY OF FOREIGNERS, 23 A.J..L. 133, 134 (Spedai Number 1929).

e.g., Freman, supra note 36, at 118.
iACKWORTH, supra note 3, at 526.
4Id. at 526.

4sSee,

465.:
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contractual duties. 4 8 Given this view, a distinction can be made
between acts of a government in breaching a contract which are based
on its role as a private entity or corporate contractor and a government
breach based on its sovereign power. Sovereign action could bring
about an immediate international breach while a breach stemming
from the normal contractual relationship would require initial recourse
to the local courts. In the latter case, the basis of the claim would be
strictly contractual in nature, while in the former instance, the basis of
the international wrong would arise from the tortious character of the
act. 49 A difficulty arises in determining what type of governmental
activity is tortious. The question to be answered is what type of
confiscatory breach by a state is forbidden under international law.
There is unanimous agreement that the arbitrary non-performance
of a contract by a state, where there is no attempt to justify the breach,
constitutes internationally illegal conduct. "It is the power of the state
coupled with the disregard of the alien's legitimate interests that
constitutes internationally illegal conduct." 50 The American Law Institute has expressed the United States' view in a similar manner. In its
opinion a breach of contract by a state is wrongful under international
law where "the breach is effected in an arbitrary manner without bona
fide claim of excuse..." 5 1 By such state actions, the interests of the
individual are extinguished by the state without the guise of legality.
This type of breach immediately characterizes it as an act amounting to
an international tort, regardless of its concurrent nature as a possible
52
breach of contract.
Varying opinions exist as to whether sovereign acts purporting to
have legal justification may violate international law as well as breach
an international contractual obligation. One view declares any use of
sovereign legislative or executive power to alter contract obligations to
be contrary to principles of international law. 5 3 Others see the use of a
sovereign decree to modify or annul a contract as entirely free from the
constraints of public international law. "Contracts are governed by the
law determined by the private international law of the forum. That law
'not merely sustains but because it sustains, may also modify or
dissolve the contractual bond.'
But in most instances the problem of confiscatory breach has not
been viewed as an "either-or" proposition. Instead, attempts have
been made to distinguish different exercises of power and categorize
only certain types of confiscation resulting from a contract breach as
",54

48

ld. at 511.

49

F. DUNN, supra note 9, at 165.
Mann, supra note 2, at 574.
51
RESTATEMENTsupra note 15, § 193.
52
Mann, supra note 2, at 574.
53
See, e.g., F. Dunn, supra note 9.
54
Mann, supra note 2, at 580.
50
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internationally illegal. This moderate approach concedes that the
sovereign right of a nation to amend laws and protect its interests must
be recognized. It follows that due to the sovereign character of the
contracting party, some mobility as to contract obligations must be
given the state party. Yet, how does one formulate a rule recognizing
the existence and rights of a sovereign power while also protecting the
legitimate interests of the private party to the contract?
The 1961 Harvard Draft Convention suggests that laws altering or
annulling contract obligations may be made if they are in accord with
the general legislative practice of the nation or with generally recognized principles of international law.5 5 Hence, "it is recognized that

some leeway [must be given] to the State in the regulation of the
performance of contracts... [yet] in order to place some limitations
upon the autonomy of the state.., annulment or modification, to be
internationally lawful, must be consistent with local law, but consistent only in the sense that there is no 'clear and discriminatory
departure' from that law." '5 6 Though limits on sovereign power are
recognized, such an approach appears to favor the state at the expense
of the private party for many acts can.be characterized so as to give
them an appearance of legitimacy.
Another approach would limit a state's right to alter its contract
responsibility to cases where the decree involved reflects a general
trend in public policy. 5 7 Under this theory, the emphasis appears to be

on the intent of the particular law. If the act directly focuses on the
contract in question or on trade concessions and is an effort to mitigate
or extinguish the state's contract obligations, then it would be contrary
to international law. But, if the law stems from a trend in the state's
public policy, the change and. its resulting effects on contract performance can be consistent with international law. The interests of the
nation as a whole have preference over the concerns of the alien
investor, even if the subordination of the investor's interests might
mean the loss of valuable rights and the disappointment of legitimate
expectations.
This public policy concept suggests a distinction of proper from
illegal state action by analogy to the law of expropriation.5 By comparing a confiscatory breach of a contract with an expropriation of real or
personal property, a stronger case for redress in the event of a breach
can be made. Such a case could be established by showing that the
state party to the contract had expropriated the contract property
rights of the alien party to the contract even though the state party may
55

HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW DRAFT CONVENTION ON
THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS, Art. 12 (1961),

reprinted in 55 A.J.I.L. 548, at 566 (1961).
S6Id. at 574.
0See e.g., RESTATEMENT, SUpra note 15, §195, comment d.
58
See Mann, supra note 2, 582-91.
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have been operating under the rubric of public policy changes made by
the host government consistent with principles of international law.
Theoretically, it would be possible for a party to alter its performance
under the contract and not commit a breach by the standard of
reasonable expectations and yet violate another standard of international law through an accidental or intentional expropriatory taking of
a property right in the contract. If this situation occurred, a party to the
contract could maintain an argument for a damages claim measured by
valuation criteria appropriate under the law of expropriation for just
compensation. 9
Unfortunately, no decision of an international tribunal has dealt
specifically with the question of a state's expropriation of contract
rights between it and an alien as distinct from other property of an
alien. 60 However, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the case
United States v. Norway recognized contract rights as vested property
rights. Even though the case centered on a dispute between an alien
and a national, the decision used -the theory of expropriation in
61
awarding just compensation for the extinction of existing contracts.
Also, in the Shufeldt Claim (United States v. Guatemala), a legislative
decree annulling a concession contract was viewed as an act of taking
away property rights for which the government should compensate. 6 2
These cases express international recognition of the equivalence of
contract rights with other property rights; 63 in the Norway case, the
express notion of expropriation was used in dealing with state nullifications of contract obligations.
Allowing such an equation, what must still be shown is that the
exercise of sovereign power constitutes a taking and not merely
regulation. In cases where the decree is obviously meant to aid the
59

See, e.g., 8 M.

WHITEMAN, supra note 5, at 1085-1136.
supra note 15, §195, reporters' note.
Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration 111 (1922), reprinted in 17 A.J.I.L.
362, 383 (1922).
622 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 1079, 3 Dept. of State Arb. Series 851 (1932).
63
The American Law Institute has expressed a similar view. They state, "The
taking by a state, of an alien's rights under a contract with the state, is governed in
general by the same principles as the taking of an alien's property." RESTATEMENT,
supra note 15, §195, comment a. A like approach also appears to have been taken by
the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States. In determining
whether a claim for a contract breach will be recognized, the Commission has made an
attempt to find whether the particular claim constitutes a taking of property. This has
been necessary since lump sum settlement agreements reached between the United
States and other nations inevitably require a showing of some taking of a defined
property interest prior to allowing a recovery by the individual claimant. Yet whatever
the reason, in the claims before the Commission based on a contract breach it has been
necessary for the claimant to demonstrate that the loss resulted in the taking of some
vested property right. Mere executory agreements, short of some type of performance, have not been held sufficient to bring a recovery. But where the claim has
been allowed the Commission has noted that the contract rights amounted to property
rights, the taking of which required compensation. Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission of the United States, supra note 12.
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state in avoiding particular contract obligations or in furthering some
specific end the success of which is hindered by the particular contract,
a taking would not be difficult to prove. 64 But where the law is less
definite, difficulty might arise in distinguishing an expropriation from
mere regulation. The conclusion that must be reached in order to allow
such a decree to be termed "regulation" is that the law is directed to the
general health and safety of the nation's
citizens or is a legitimate
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means of protecting national interests.
IV
Several conclusions can be made. The first is that careful
draftsmanship of an international contract can avoid an international
dispute in most cases. Second, the espousal of a claim by a state is a
discretionary matter. Further, if a nation chooses to pursue a claim, the
individual loses his particular interest in the aggregation with other
claims, thereby making recovery a matter of equity. Also, in determining when a claim can be made by the state, it is necessary and
expedient to distinguish an international breach based on a "denial of
justice" from one which arises from a confiscatory breach by the state.
In the former instance, an international violation occurs through
judicial abuse at any stage of the proceedings. What must be shown
before an international claim can be made is the willingness of the
private party to submit the dispute to local judicial authorities. After
this prerequisite is met, any arbitrary or capricious judicial act or
omission constitutes a violation of international law. However, not all
sovereign decrees resulting in a contract breach violate international
law. Only where the use of sovereign power is highly discriminatory or
arbitrary will international principles become involved. Perhaps the
best way to define such conduct as arbitrary is to distinguish between
government acts which are regulatory in nature and those which
constitute a taking of property. In the former instance, no international
violation would occur. But where there is a taking, an analogy to the
theory of expropriation should be made. The confiscatory breach
should be declared contrary to international principles and just compensation should be forthcoming.
DAVID HAMILTON

"An example of such a case is El Triunfo Co. (U.S. v. Salvador), 1902 U.S.
FOREIGN RELATIONS 859, where an executive decree expressly directed to the particular
concessions involved was found contrary to principles of international law.
6SSee Mann, supra note 2, at 586-87. Prof. Mann suggests ample guidance in
making a taking-regulation distinction can be found in United States decisions
focusing on the proper scope of what is called the "police power" of the State.

